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Employer Lawsuits Against Employees-The
Right To Invoke The Legal Process Despite
Anti-Union Motivation Or Coercive Effect On
Section 7 Rights
On November 15, 1974, John E. Sanford was discharged by
Power Systems, Inc. for failing to perform his assigned work as a
mill-might on a turbine generator disassembly crew.' Sanford
filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (Board),
alleging he had been fired because of union activity. The Board
officer in charge of Subregion 38, however, refused to issue a
complaint against Power Systems since he found no evidence
that Sanford had been discharged for engaging in protected conduct. Sanford's subsequent appeal was dismissed by the Office of
Appeals of the General Counsel. Approximately eighteen months
later, Sanford filed similar charges with the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA), alleging that complaints he
had filed regarding unsafe working conditions had motivated his
dismissal. These charges were dismissed by the Department of
Labor?
Power Systems subsequently discovered that Sanford had
filed unfair labor practice charges against labor organizations
and former employers in forty-six separate cases since 1967.'
Excluding the instant decision, only one case had resulted in a
Board order; the remaining forty-four cases had either been
.~
Systems filed a civil
withdrawn, dismissed, or ~ e t t l e d Power
complaint against Sanford on September 6, 1977, alleging that
he had filed charges with the Board and OSHA without probable
cause with the intention of harassing Power Systems.
Power Systems sought recovery of legal fees incurred in de1. Sanford, a union steward, had engaged in protected activity "which disrupted the
job and caused it to fall seriously behind schedule." Power Systems, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B.
445 (1978), enforcement denied, 601 F. 2d 936 (7th Cir. 1979).
2. 239 N.L.R.B. at 445-46.
3. Id. at 446. Thirty cases involved charges against labor organizations and the remainder involved charges against employers. Id. See also Power Systems, Inc. v. NLRB,
601 F.2d 936, 937 (1979).
4. Charges were voluntarily withdrawn by Sanford in 27 cases, the board dismissed
the charges in 13 cases, and four cases were settled. One case led to a Board Order.
Power Systems, Inc. represented the 46th action filed by Sanford. 239 N.L.R.B. at 446.
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fending these charges as well as a permanent injunction enjoining Sanford from filing cases in any federal, state, or administrative court against them." However, the Board held that by
suing Sanford, Power Systems had violated section 8(a)(l) and
(4) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA): since such action had "the unlawful objective of penalizing Sanford for filing
a charge with the Board, and thus, depriving him of, and discouraging [other] employees from seeking access to the Board's
pro~esses."~
The Board required Power Systems to withdraw its
suit against Sanford and to make Sanford whole for all legal expenses he incurred in the defense of Power Systems' l a ~ s u i t . ~
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to enforce
the Board's order, finding no evidence of improper motive on
the part of Power Systems in filing its complaint against
Sanford.'

A. Clyde Taylor Co.
In Clyde Taylor Co.,1° Mr. Taylor was the superintendent of
the sheet metal department in a mechanical contracting firm
that was owned and operated by a partnership. In April, 1958,
the partnership dissolved, and arrangements were made with
Taylor to take over the sheet metal business.ll He immediately
exercised employer prerogative by firing the union stewardlaand
by informing the remaining employees that they "could continue
5. Id. On December 20, 1979, the request for an injunction was deleted. Id. at 44647.
6. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;

....

(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he
has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter . . . .
29 U.S.C. 8 158(a)(l), (4) (1976).
7. 239 N.L.R.B. at 449.
8. Id. at 450.
9. Power Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 1979).
10. 127 N.L.R.B. 103 (1960).
11. Id. at 104.
12. Id. at 105. Frank Houston, the union steward, had filed grievances with the
Board "concerning Taylor's alleged hiring of too many apprentices and his use of unqualified laborers to do sheet metal work." Id. One employee testified that prior to Houston's discharge, Taylor had warned that " 'Frank Houston was getting too big for his own
good in this union business and it looked like he was going to let him go.' " Id.
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to work for him unless 'they wanted to stick with the Union.' "lS
Four employees, who expressed allegiance to the Union, were
paid in full and instructed " 'to get their tools and get out.' "I4
Shortly thereafter, Taylor applied for and obtained a state court
injunction banning picketing by the Union.l5
Unfair labor practice charges were subsequently filed
against Taylor. The trial examiner heard testimony that Taylor
had told one of the charging parties that he should not have
signed charges against him, that the employees had caused him
public embarrassment, and that they " 'were opening [themselves] wide open to a libel suit.' "I6 The Board adopted the trial
examiner's conclusion that Taylor impliedly threatened to sue
for libel in retaliation for the charges filed against him, "and
that the threat, in the context made, constitute[d] an unfair labor practice."17 However, the Board insisted that by condemning
threats it did not question the normal right of all persons to resort to the civil courts to adjudicate their claims.l8
In fact, the Board rejected the trial examiner's finding that
Taylor had violated Section B(a)(l) of the NLRA by obtaining
the state court injunction banning peaceful picketing? The trial
examiner had relied on the Board's earlier decision in W.T.
Carter & Bro.,'O which held that an employer's use of legal proceedings to discourage employees from exercising their rights
under the NLRA rather than to advance any legitimate interest
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 106.
16. Id. at 108. Taylor asked the employee " 'to talk to some of the boys and try to
get them to drop it.' " Id.
17. Id. The Board stated that:
Such a threat, express or implied, is of a harassing nature. It would normally
tend to intimidate an individual contemplating filing a charge, from doing so,
or one, who has filed a charge, to withdraw it. Accordingly, we agre [sic] with
the Trial Examiners that such a threat restrains employees in the exercise of
the right to file charges under the Act and thus is coercive and violative of
Section 8(a) (1).

Id.
18. "We interdict here only the making of a threat by an employer to resort to the
civil courts as a tactic calculated to restrain employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act." Id. (emphasis added). Had Taylor simply filed an action for libelous
publication rather than threatened such action against the complaining employees, the
Board arguably would have found no unfair labor practice, notwithstanding an ostensible
bad faith motive to harass and intimidate them.
19. Id. at 109.
20. 90 N.L.R.B.2020 (1950).
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of his own, was an unfair labor practice." The Board had stated
in Carter that a person's right to resort to the courts-was not
absolute but was restricted by the law of abuse of process.2a
Thus, if an employer's lawsuit evinced an underlying anti-union
motive, it was labeled an abuse of process, rejected as an invalid
exercise of a protected right, and rendered susceptible to censure as coercive conduct constituting an unfair labor practice."
Clyde Taylor expressly overruled Carter. The Board emphasized Chairman Herzog's dissent in Carter which insisted
"that the Board should accommodate its enforcement of the Act
to the right of all persons to litigate their claims in court, rather
than condemn the exercise of such right as an unfair labor
pra~tice."~~
Board member Fanning, who wrote a concurring opinion in
Clyde Taylor, was the sole defender of the abuse of process rationale in Carter. Although he agreed with the Board's ultimate
result in Clyde Taylor, he argued that factual distinctions made
it unnecessary to overrule Carter. He found the employer's conduct in Carter to be more pervasive than Tay10r's~~
and was impressed that Taylor's actual use of civil proceedings did not bear
a sufficiently close relationship to the achievement of anti-union
objectives. Fanning agreed that an employer's threatened legal
action constitutes an unfair labor practice, but he also insisted
that an employer's actual lawsuit brought in bad faith against
his employees renders an otherwise legitimate exercise of the absolute right to resort to the courts a violation of section 8(a)(l)
of the NLRA? Nevertheless, the doctrine articulated by the
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 2024.
It is "an abuse of legal process when such process is invoked in bad faith." Id.
Id. at 2024, see id. at 2023.
127 N.L.R.B. at 109.
In Carter, the trial examiner had found that the employer also violated 5 8(a)(l)

by:
(1) refusing to permit the holding of the outdoor meetings on company property; (2) causing peace officers to prevent such meetings; (3) following union
organizers when they drove through the streets of the company-owned town;
and (4) using a reporter to take notes at two open union meetings.
Id.
26. Member Fanning was "not persuaded by the record that [Taylor] resorted to the

State court for injunctive relief in bad faith, that is, to defeat union organization of his
employees rather than to protect any legitimate interest of his own," and therefore voted
with other members of the Board to dismiss the allegation that Taylor violated § 8(a)(l)
of the NLRA. Id. at 110. Member Fanning joined the Chairman and other members of
the Board in holding that Taylor's threat to sue for libel interfered with, restrained, and
coerced employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by 5 7 of the NLRA. Id. See
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majority in Clyde Taylor became a fortress protecting employers
whose use of legal processes may have intentionally or unintentionally chilled employee exercise of section 7 rights.
In a related case decided by the Supreme Court, Textile
Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. CO.,'' the majority recognized a right of managerial prerogative, the exercise of which
would not violate section B(a)(l) of the NLRA even though there
might be some coincidental interference with section 7 rights.
The Court concluded that an employer's decision to go out of
business-even if completely motivated by anti-union animus
-does not amount to an unfair labor practice." Thus, the Supreme Court created an exception to the NLRA sections that
restrict employer freedom, an exception built "around the nonstatutory concept of management prer~gatives.''~~
By implication the Court established a category of business decisions that
section S(a)(l) and its companion subsections of the NLRA
could not restrict. An employer's right to sue in civil court may
fall within the protected area of management prerogative.

B. United Aircraft Corp.: The Board Refines the Rule
Regarding Threats
In United Aircraft Gorp.," the Board was called upon to
review the propriety of an employer's threat of legal action to
achieve a stronger bargaining position against its affiliated
union.31 Employees had previously filed charges with the Board,
claiming that company supervisors at United Aircraft had engaged in unfair labor practices by threatening economic reprisals
and by offering benefits conditioned upon abandonment of a
strike." In an attempt to induce the charging parties to withdraw their unfair labor practice charges, United Aircraft
threatened civil action based on numerous legal claims that had
arisen during a bitter strike against the company in 1960.3s
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1976).
27. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
28. Id. at 270.
29. Rabin, Limitations on Employer Independent Action, 27 VAND.L. REV.133,145
(1974).
30. 192 N.L.R.B. 382 (1971).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 383.
33. Id. at 384. Union members resorted to violence during the strike, causing property damage to homes and cars. Threatening phone calls were also made, intimidating
employees desirous of returning to work United Aircraft Corp. v. I.A.M., 70 L.R.R.M.
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When the employees refused to drop their charges, United Aircraft brought an action against them in Connecticut Superior
Court and secured judgments in excess of one million dollars?
The employees amended their initial complaint, alleging
that United Aircraft committed additional unfair labor practices
by threatening to bring suit unless the unions withdrew their
charges, and by actually bringing suit when the unions ultimately refused to capitulate, thereby coercing and restraining its
employees in the exercise of their section 7 rightsP The Board,
relying upon a literal interpretation of Clyde Taylor, dismissed
the allegations that United Aircraft's actual lawsuit constituted
an unfair labor practice. It reasoned that although a threat of
legal action "calculated to restrain employees in the exercise of
their rights" is a violation of section 8(a)(l),an actual suit is not
similarly ~ n l a w f u lWith
. ~ ~ continuing confidence in its prior interpretation of Clyde Taylor, the Board further concluded that
United Aircraft's threat to file suit unless a settlement agreement was reached did not constitute the kind of tactic normally
used to restrain employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
by the NLRA." The Board viewed the opposing claims of the
employer and the employees as potentially offsetting. It theorized, under what appears to be a common law notion of setoff:8
that a threat to bring a civil action as part of a good-faith effort
to negotiate a settlement of numerous claims, "with each party
giving up its claims against the other," is not unlawful under the
NLRA? On appeal?O the Second Circuit approved the Board's
2577, 2578 (Conn. Super. Ct. Hartford Cty. 1968).
34. 192 N.L.R.B. at 384.
35. Id.
36. Id. The Board reiterated its well established rationale "that 'the Board should
accommodate its enforcement of the Act to the right of all persons to litigate their claims
in court, rather than condemn the exercise of such right as an unfair labor practice.' " Id.
(quoting Clyde Taylor, 127 N.L.R.B. at 109). "The Board has consistently held that the
filing of a civil suit cannot be found to be an unfair labor practice." Id. (footnote omitted). The Board's decision was upheld on appeal. Lodges 743 and 1746, Intl Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. United Aircraft, 534 F.2d 422, 464 (2nd Cir. 1975).
37. 192 N.L.R.B. at 384 (quoting Clyde Taylor, 127 N.L.R.B. at 108).
38. Setoff is defined as a defense or independent claim made by a defendant to
counterbalance that of the plaintiff. Studley v. Boylston Nat'l Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528
(1913). It is sometimes characterized as a "mode of defense whereby the defendant acknowledges the justice of the plaintiff's demands on the one hand, but on the other, sets
up a demand of his own to counterbalance it, either in whole or in part." 20 AM. JUR. 2~
Counterclaim, Recoupment, a d Setoff 5 2 (1965) (footnote omitted).
39. 192 N.L.R.B. at 384.
40. Lodges 743 and 1746, Intl Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. United

886

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I980

reasoning and observed:
[Tlhe "threats" in this case were not conveyed by an employer
to a single employee; they were an integral part of negotiations
in which both sides were represented by sophisticated labor
counsel who were more than familiar with the rights of the parties, and particularly the right to file unfair labor practice
charges with the Board."

The employer was credited with having a legitimate cause of action against his employees that he was willing to forego if they in
turn would withdraw their unfair labor practice charges."
In 1972 the Board decided West Point Pepperell, Inc.,(' a
case involving an employer's threat to sue its afliliated union unless unfair labor practice charges filed against the employer were
withdrawd4 The employer advanced several legal theories justifying his threatened civil action against the union? The employer, in essence, had admonished the union to either accept
Aircraft, 534 F.2d 422 (2nd Cir. 1975).
41. Id. at 464.
42. Id. The Board had quoted Judge Gaffney who concluded in his Connecticut Superior Court decision that the employer did not "use these lawsuits for bargaining purposes to induce the defendanta to withdraw their claims in their action in the United
States District Court." 192 N.L.R.B. at 384 n.13 (quoting United Aircraft Corp., 70
L.R.R.M. at 2577,2580). In essence, the state court found no express or implied purpose
to use actual litigation to induce the charging parties to drop their unfair labor practice
charges. The State Court, however, did not address the employer's use of threats prior to
the actual lawsuit as a means of pressuring union members to abandon their unfair labor
practice claims against the employer.
43. 200 N.L.R.B. 1031 (1972).
44. Id. at 1039.
45. The employer in West Point Pepperell alleged, inter alia, that the union
breached its contract by filing charges against the employer. Although the Board did not
discuss in detail the contractual agreement between the union and the employer, it criticized any provision in a contract that would prohibit access to the Board by a complaining party. Such a "prohibition as a mutter of public policy would not be binding on
the Board, nor, it would appear, on the Union." Id. (emphasis in original). The employer
also contended that the unfair labor practices charges filed by the union were unmeritorious. The Board stated, however, that " 'access to the Board's processes for vindication of a statutory violation is fundamental and is to be kept open without roadblocks or
hindrance. Neither employer nor union may restrain, coerce or interfere with that right,
whether or not it deems the charge meritorious-a question for the Board, not a charged
party, to decide. See Local 138, Intl Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, 148
N.L.R.B. 679,681.' " Id. (quoting W . T . Grant Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 93,96 (1967)). In addition, the Board in West Point Pepperell cited, inter alia, Waterman Industries Inc., 91
N.L.R.B. 1041, 1043 n.8 (1950) (does not matter even if charge proved invalid after trial
on the merits and N.L.R.B. v. Scrivener, 404 U.S. 821 (1972) (all persons with information concerning unfair labor practices are to be free from coercion in bringing them
before the Board).
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the contention that the union's unfair labor practice charges
were unlawful and withdraw them, or face the costly consequences of a lawsuit.46The Board concluded that the employer's
threat was without legal foundation and that it constituted a
bad faith attempt to clothe with the integrity of the legal process the employer's designs to interfere with, coerce, and restrain
its employees in the exercise of their protected rights under the
NLRA." The Board rejected the employer's reliance on United
Aircraft by distinguishing the ostensible groundlessness of the
threatened legal action in West Point Pepperell from the unquestionable legitimacy of the legal claims asserted against the
union in United Aircraft Corp. The Board found West Point
Pepperell's threat to be "retaliatory in nature, as in Taylor, and
not remotely connected with a conciliatory move, as in United
Aircraf t."48
46. The Board has consistently found it to be an unfair labor prictice for an employer to threaten employees with legal action in an attempt to hinder employees from
exercising their rights under $ 8 of the NLRA.For example, in S.E. Nichols Marcy Corp.,
229 N.L.R.B. 75 (1977), the employer's supervisor told the employee that if rumors of
her union membership became known to the manager she would be fired. She repeated
this conversation at two separate employee meetings. During the course of the second,
the company president told her to "'shut her mouth' because she could be sued for
saying such things." Id. at 79. The Board held this threat to be coercive and thus violative of $ 8(a)(l). But see Clyde Taylor Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 103, 109 (1960).
47. The trial examiner stated, "I am convinced and find from the timing of the letter [threatening to file suit] in relation to the filing of the charge, and from the contents
of the letter, that the letter was touched off by the charge and was substantially if not
entirely directed at it." 200 N.L.R.B. at 1039. There is a clear distinction between negotiating to setoff opposing well-founded legal claims to avoid the inevitable cost and inconvenience of multiple proceedings and grasping at straws to substantiate a threat of a
retaliatory lawsuit unless unfair labor practice charges are dropped. In a case involving a
union's threat to file a lawsuit againat an employer for breach of a subcontracting clause
in their collective bargaining agreement, the purpose of the threat being to coerce the
employer to cease doing business with a non-union subcontractor, the Board recognized
the existence of a legitimate cause of action for breach of contract and concluded that
the threat was not "a groundless threat simply calculated to unlawfully harass and coerce the Company." Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 217 N.L.R.B. 946,949
(1975). The Board reasoned that the union was entitled to enforce the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in a competent jurisdiction and logically had a concomitant
right to threaten such action in order to give the employer an opportunity to abide by
the contract and avoid a lawsuit. Id. at 948.
48. 200 N.L.R.B. at 1040. "Unlike United Aircraft, there was here no implied recognition of the statutory right to file a charge and in that context a suggested 'tradeoff' or
settlement of confiicting claims growing out of a strike." Id.
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C. Refinement of the Absolute Right to Sue
In Fashion Fair, I ~ C . , decided
'~
in 1964, the Board exhibited remarkable obeisance to a literal interpretation of Clyde
Taylor. There was ample evidence on the record that Fashion
Fair had been motivated primarily by anti-union animus in obtaining a state court injunction banning peaceful picketing. The
Board determined that the injunction obtained by Fashion Fair
was without a legal basis under Indiana law and was "essentially
motivated by [a] continuing aversion to the Union and by a desire to harass the picketers in the exercise of their protected conNevertheless, the Board sustained its excerted activitie~."~~
isting policy of not enforcing the NLRA in a manner that
impinged upon the right of all persons to litigate their claims in
court;" it did not attempt to distinguish the facts from those in
Clyde Taylor. It appeared that any lingering notions of motive
and intents2 as controlling factors in judging employer use of legal processes to achieve management objectives suffered a general coup de grace at the hands of the Board in Fashion Fair.6s
49. 159 N.L.R.B. 1435 (1964).
50. Id. at 1449.
51. Id.
52. The Board a r m e d the trial examiner's decision in Television Wisconsin, Inc.,
224 N.L.R.B. 722 (1976), which included a footnote stating that "[iln Taylor the Board
distinguished between threat to sue and the filing of a suit without seemingly distinguishing between the intent behind them." Id. at 780 n.80.
53. If there ever was an opportunity to apply Member Fanning's ostensible adherence to Carter and the legitimate motivation test advanced in his concurring opinion in
Ctyde Taylor, this would be the case. The unfair labor practices perpetrated by the employer in Fashion Fair, Inc. correspond qualitatively to those in Carter and, according to
Member Fanning, would be distinguishable from conduct in Clyde Taylor since they
"bear a closer relationship to the obtaining of injunctive relief." Clyde Taylor Co., 127
N.L.R.B. 103, 110 (1960). The Board, however, adopted the majority view in Clyde Taylor and acknowledged an apparent absolute right to invoke the legal process in spite of
anti-union animus.
In D.C. International Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 1383 (1967), the Board approved the trial
examiner's reliance on Clyde Taylor in dismissing alleged unfair labor practice charges
against an employer who requested police officers to arrest a discharged employee who
refused to leave company property. The employee claimed that his arrest was spawned
by unfair labor practice charges he had filed against his former employer for discriminatory termination of employment. In a footnote accompanying his decision, the trial examiner displayed his confidence in the well accepted rule of Clyde Taylor:
Were I not convinced that the principle of Clyde Taylor Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 103,
required dismissal of the allegation herein, I would recommend dismissal of the
allegation on the basis that the preponderance of the evidence does not reveal
that the Respondent [employer] caused Stanley's arrest because he had filed
unfair labor practices under the Act with the Board.
Id. at 1394 11.14. The trial examiner considered the rule in Clyde Taylor to be an abso-
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The supposed coup de grace was short lived as the Board
has revived a motive and intent test in a series of cases featuring
unfair labor practice allegations against unions for filing lawsuits
against their members to enforce disciplinary fines (hereinafter
referred to as the "union-plaintiff cases"). In Retail Clerks
Union Local 770," the Board held that resort to the courts to
confirm an arbitrator's award and enforce an alleged contract
right was not violative of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(a) of the NLRA
since the union acted in good faith? However, in United Stanford Employees, Local 680," the Board held that a lawsuit seeking to compel employees to sign articles of membership in the
union and to perform acts necessary to retain membership in the
union constituted an unfair labor practice since the suit sought
to enforce unlawful objectives."
The Board reached a similar result in Television Wisconsin,
I ~ C where
. , ~ the Communications Workers of American sought
judicial enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement that
required employees as a condition of employment to meet obligations beyond the payment of dues and initiation fees. Since
such obligations-imposed by an unlawful union security clause
and a separate clause restraining employees from exercising
their right to cross picket lines-were illegal under the NLRA,
the Board held that legal action taken by the union to enforce
them constituted a violation of sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2).
In Television Wisconsin, Inc., the trial examiner concluded that
"the rationale of the Retail Clerks case [suggests that the Clyde
Taylor] holding has been substantially modified and that the
Board has narrowed its accommodation of its enforcement of the
Act to the right of all persons to litigate their claims in
This narrowing of the Clyde Taylor doctrine of accommodalute rule guaranteeing the right to invoke legal processes and precluding an exploration
of the facts to discern motive, intenf, or anti-union animus. Only in the absence of Clyde
Taylor would the trial examiner feel compelled to examine the employer's state of mind
and underlying purpose in invoking the legal process against Stanley, his employee.
54. 218 N.L.R.B. 680 (1975).
55. The court determined the action "was held not to be the kind of tactic cakuhted to restrain employees or employers in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the
Act." Id. at 683 (emphasis added).
56. 232 N.L.R.B. 326 (1977).
57. Id. "This was an unlawful objective inasmuch as the Act permits unions to impose only financial core obligations on employees in the administration of contractual
union-security provisions." Id. at 331.
58. 224 N.L.R.B. 722 (1976).
59. Id. at 780.
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tion has not been limited to legal action taken by unions against
their members. The Board, for example, has also refused to accommodate its enforcement of the NLRA to the right of a landowner to engage state police support to prevent peaceful picketing on private property leased to an employer. Recognizing the
right of employees to picket their employer at his primary location, the Board held in Frank ViscegliasOthat restriction of access to such property-motivated by anti-union animus and accomplished in part by requesting police arrests of employees
who persisted in picketing-constituted a violation of section
S(a)(l).@lLawsuits attempting to enforce obviously unlawful
objectives, whether pursued by unions, employers, or anyone
else, were declared to be outside the fortress erected by Clyde
Taylor around one's absolute right to invoke the legal process.6a
11. Power Systems Inc.: IMPROPER
CONSIDERATION
OF ANTIUNIONMOTIVATION
In Power Systems, Inc.,bVhe Board found that because
Power System's lawsuit had been filed without probable cause
and had been motivated by anti-union animus, it was not privileged by the Board's Clyde Taylor policy of "accommodating its
processes to the normal right of all parties to resort to the civil
courts" to adjudicate their claim^.^ The Board ordered Power
60. 203 N.L.R.B. 265 (1973).
61. Id. The Board reasoned that the Respondent's lease to the employer, accompanied by a right of access granted to employees of the lessee, gave employees a parallel
right of access for picketing. The road was a "limited access road" indicating the respondent's intent to permit its use by classes of persons acceptable to the respondent. Employees of the lessee were necessarily contemplated members of that class, and the respondent's resort to legal processes, i.e., requesting arrests of picketing employees
constituted interference with the employee's exercise of 8 7 rights. Id. at 266-67.
62. See, e.g., Int'l. Org. of Masters, Mates, and Pilots, 224 N.L.R.B. 1626 (1976).
There the administrative law judge concluded that the union's action was "an afterthought, constituting a strategem to mask Respondents' real intent." Id. at 1626 n.2. The
union's lawsuit was found to have been filed in pursuit of unlawful objectives, and therefore unprotected by the Clyde Taylor doctrine. The District of Columbia Circuit conh e d the Board's decision adding that the language in Clyde Taylor
does not indicate that the filing of a lawsuit will never be regarded as an unfair
labor practice . . . Rather, the language is, in our view, a mere expression of
a general liberality in accommodating the filing of lawsuits. Where, as here, the
lawsuit . . .was intimately related to ongoing picketing for an unlawful objective . . . we can see no inconsistency between Clyde Taylor Co. [and its progeny] and the Board's determination in this instance.
Int'l Org. of Masters, Mates and Pilots v. NLRB,575 F.2d 896, 906-07 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
63. 239 N.L.R.B. 445 (1978).
64. Id. at 449.

.
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Systems to refrain from prosecuting its state court action against
Sanford and ordered Power Systems to reimburse Sanford for
the costs he incurred in defending against the lawsuit.
The Board explained its departure from a literal application
of Clyde Taylor on the basis of Retail Clerks, United Stanford
Employees, and Television Wisconsin, Inc., which teach that
lawsuits brought in furtherance of "unlawful objectives" are not
accorded Clyde Taylor protecti~n.'~The Board apparently attempted to distinguish between lawsuits nourished by hostility
toward employee exercise of section 7 rights and lawsuits that
are not used tactically to restrain employees from exercising
such rights."
In refusing to enforce the Board's order against Power System, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that its holding was a narrow one.'? It had merely concluded upon a review of the whole
record that insufficient evidence existed to support the Board's
finding that Power. Systems filed its lawsuit without probable
cause and for an improper purpose. The court did not question
the Board's salient departure from its well-established policy of
strictly accomodating one's right of access to the courts.68 In
addition, it failed to examine whether the Board possessed
power to censure an employer's lawsuit against his employee as
an unfair labor practice.

111. CRITICISM
- o Power
~
Systems Inc.
In Power Systems Inc., the Board wanted to engraft motive
and intent onto the Clyde Taylor rule, even though Clyde Taylor wielded the scalpel by which they were severed from the
traditional process of detecting an unfair labor practice. By
focusing upon the coercive effect of Power Systems' lawsuit
65. Id. at 449-50. The Board acknowledged that it had "on several occasions departed from a literal application of Clyde Taylor where the civil lawsuit was brought in
order to pursue an unlawful objective." Id. at 449. While each of those cases dealt with a
lawsuit filed by a labor union, the Board concluded that there is "no reason to apply a
different standard to an employer that institutes a civil lawsuit with an unlawful objective against an employee." Id. at 450.
66. Id. at 449-50.
67. Power Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1979).
68. The court observed that "the Board did not reject the principle in Clyde Taylor,
. . . that the filing of a civil complaint by an employer or labor organization against an
employee or member does not violate the Act." Id. at 938. While the the Board did not
expressly reject Clyde Taylor, it departed from the traditional application of the Clyde
Taylor principle of protecting an employer's absolute right to invoke the legal process.
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against its employees and by defining it as an "unlawful objective," the Board found an unfair labor practice despite the implied charge in Clyde Taylor to avoid scrutinizing the intent or
motive underlying one's resort to the legal process. The Board
appears to have tacitly applied the abuse of process doctrine and
consequently to have returned to its position in Carter without
admitting it?@
The Board refused to acknowledge Power Systems' legal
claim as an action brought in good faith, even though it expressed a proper purpose on its face. The Board looked beyond
the legal objectives of the lawsuit to scrutinize underlying motives and divine the actual purpose for which it was filed. This
simply amounts to a revival of Carter and its attendant abuse of
process limitation on an employer's absolute right to invoke the
legal process.70
69. Recall that Carter limited an employer's absolute right to resort to the courts
"by the law of malicious prosecution and wrongful initiation of civil proceedings." 90
N.L.R.B. at 2024. Malicious prosecution consists of any proceeding of a criminal character initiated without probable cause, with malice, or a primary purpose other than
OF THE LAWOF TORTS
achieving just prosecution of an offender. W. PROSSER,HANDBOOK
835 (4th ed. 1971). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS
$8 653,672 (1972). The Board
is usually concerned with "wrongful initiation of civil proceedings" or abuse of procesa
rather than malicious prosecution. The authors of the Restatement have articulated a
distinction between malicious prosecution and abuse of process:
[Abuse of process] is not the wrongful procurement of legal process or the
wrongful initiation of criminal or civil proceedings; it is the misuse of process,
no matter how properly obtained, for any purpose other than that which it was
designed to accomplish. Therefore, it is immaterial that the process was properly issued, that it was obtained in the course of proceedings that were brought
with probable cause and for a proper purpose, or even that the proceedings
terminated in favor of the person instituting or initiating them. The subsequent misuse of the process, though properly obtained, constitutes the misconduct for which the liability is imposed under the rule. Id. 8 682, Comment a.
70. Member Fanning, who dissented in Clyde Taylor and argued against overruling
Carter, is now Chairman of the NLRB. The motive and intent analysis he adhered to in
Clyde Taylor now forms a large part of the Board's analysis.
The Seventh Circuit reversed the Board in Power Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d
936 (7th Cir. 1979). The court, however, intimated "no view on the scope of the Board's
power to determine, in circumstances other than those presented [in the instant case],
that the filing of a civil action based upon the defendant's charge filed with the Board is
an unfair labor practice." Id. at 940. Instead, it merely rejected the Board's findings of
fact regarding Power System's bad faith motive in pursuing an action in court for the
purpose of chilling an employee's exercise of 8 7 rights. Id. The court recognized "that
civil actions for malicious prosecution carry with them a potential for chilling employee
compaints to the Board and that the Board may, in a proper case, act to curb such
conduct." Id.

EMPLOYER LAWSUITS

A. Abuse of Process Theory Misapplied
Abuse of process has traditionally been found only where
the legal process is used "against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed."?' Dean Prosser
identifies the essential elements of abuse of process as "first, an
ulterior purpose, and second, a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the pr~ceeding."~Wotwithstanding "an incidental motive of spite or an ulterior purpose or benefit" to the employer, there is no "abuse of process
when the process is used for the purpose for which it is intended."?' The improper purpose element of common law abuse
of process "usually takes the form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly invoked in the process itself, by
. . . the use of process as a threat or a club."?'
The abuse of process doctrine is highly susceptible to misapplication when employed in adjudicating emotionally charged
labor relations conflicts. Enforcement of the NLRA presupposes
a struggle between management and labor to achieve self-serving
political and financial objectives-a rivalry typically fraught
with feelings of contempt and distrust. Consequently, a lawsuit
filed by an employer against an employee or a union is intuitively clothed with a shroud of suspect bad motive, tempting the
Board to find an unfair labor practice.
In Clyde Taylor the Board correctly regarded Taylor's unfettered right of access to the courts to sue employees for
libelous statements published against him. Yet the Board was
also correct in declaring Taylor's threat to sue, a club he wielded
over the heads of his employees to obtain collateral advantage,
to be beyond the protection accorded his right to invoke the legal
71. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTSg 682 (1974) (emphasis added). Abuse of process consists of "misusing, or misapplying process justified in itself for an end other than
supra note 69, at 856 (footnote
that which it was designed to accomplish." W. PROSSER,
omitted).
supra note 69, at 857 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
72. W. PROSSER,
73. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS
5 682, Comment b (1971).
supra note 69, at 857. "There is, in other words, a form of extor74. W. PROSSER,
tion, and it is what is done in the course of negotiating rather than the issuance or any
formal use of the process itself, which constitutes the tort." Id. See F. HARPER& F.
JAMES,THELAWOF TORTS331 (1956). (One commits a tort the moment he attempts to
achieve some collateral objective outside the scope and operation of the process
employed.)
75. A willful misapplication of process contemplates a "definite act or threat not
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In Fashion Fair, Inc. the Board properly adhered to the
rule formulated in Clyde Taylor. Notwithstanding the employer's obvious aversion to the union and his unquestionable
intention to "harass the picketers in the exercise of their pro~ ~pursuing a state court injunctected concerted a ~ t i v i t i e s "by
tion, the Board found no abuse of process since the employer
used the legal process for the purpose for which it was intended
and did not engage in collateral coercive conduct.77
Proper limitation of the abuse of process theory was also
demonstrated by the Board's decision in United Aircraft Corp.,
which was subsequently a r m e d by the Second Circuit. The
Board not only acknowledged the validity of United Aircraft's
actual suit against the union, but concluded that its threat to
sue unless opposing charges were withdrawn was also permissible since it was directly related to a good faith attempt to negotiate a setoff of claims.78Quoting the Board's Chairman Herzog,
the Second Circuit concluded in Lodges 743 and 1746, International Association of Machinists v. United Aircraft C ~ r p . ,that
~@
despite probable improper motivation for both threatening to
bring and actually bringing a lawsuit against the union, "the
'Board should accommodate its enforcement of the statute to
the traditional right of all to bring their contentions to the attention of a judicial forum, rather than hold it to be an unfair
labor practice for them to attempt to do so.'
The Court rejected the application of the abuse of process
doctrine to defeat an employer's right to resort to legal processes
just because anti-union objectives may be inevitably furthered:
But even if we assume that the Company was improperly motivated-that it intended the suit to induce the Union to withdraw its charges-this alone would not make resort to the
authorized by the process, or aimed at an objective not legitimate in the use of the prosupra note 69, at 857. The Board in Clyde Taylor gave judicial effect
cess." W. PROSSER,
to this interpretation of the doctrine by declaring a threat to sue, calculated to inhibit
employees in the exercise of their rights, to be an unfair labor practice. An actual suit,
however, processed to ita designed end, could not constitute an unfair labor practice.
76. 159 N.L.R.B. at 1449 (footnote omitted).
77. The Board acknowledged the anti-union motivation accompanying the employer's lawsuit but implicitly rejected any application of abuse of process theory to challenge his right to resort to legal process. Id.
78. 192 N.L.R.B. at 384. Cf. West Point Pepperell, Inc., 200 N.L.R.B.1031, 1039
(1972) (threat to sue was motivated purely by anti-union animus and responded directly
to the filing of unfair labor practice charges by the union).
79. 534 F.2d 422 (2d. Cir. 1965).
80. Id. at 464 (quoting Carter, 90 N.L.FLB. at 2029).
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courts unlawful so as to justify an unfair labor practice finding.
Abuse of process requires more than simply improper motive.
There must also be some action taken to utilize the court's
processes for collateral purposes not related to the suit in

In short, the abuse of process doctrine should only defeat an employer's right to resort to the courts when coercive measures are
employed that are unnecessary to the pursuit of judicial
proceeding^.^^

B. The Board's Improper Reliance on the Union-Plaintiff
Cases
In condemning Power Systems' lawsuit as an unfair labor
practice, the Board found support for its decision in the series of
union-plaintiff cases which had censured the use of legal process
to accomplish "unlawful objectives," such as compelling employees to accept union obligations beyond the scope of the NLRA,M
enforcing illegal union-security clauses:4 and restraining or coercing employers in the selection of representatives for collective-bargaining purposes.86 In each instance a labor organization
was held to have invoked the legal process to pursue an end having no legal foundation. In focusing its attention on the illicit
purposes of the lawsuits in these cases, the Board curiously
failed to distinguish malicious use of process, the tort actually
committed in these cases, from abuse of process, the only plausible tort supported by the facts in Power Systems, Inc.
Abuse of process differs from malicious use of process in
that the latter is committed by "commencing an action or causing process to issue without j w t i f i c a t i ~ n , "whereas
~
the former
81. Id. at 464-65 (footnote omitted).
82. Id. at 465.
83. United Stanford Employees, Local 680,232 N.L.R.B. 326,331 (1977) (union filed
lawsuit seeking damages for breach of contract and compelling specific performance of
oral employment contracta with employer which bound employees to accept union
membership).
84. Television Wisconsin, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 722, 780 (1976) (civil action filed by
union against employees who resigned from union as a means of collecting fines assessed
for violation of union-security clause that exceeded the limited form permitted by the
proviso to § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.
85. IOMMP, 224 N.L.R.B. 1626, 1634-35 (1976) (Union's in rem action against the
ship owner's vessel had as its purpose the compulsion of owners to accept union's bargaining agreement and replace bargaining representative with union members).
86. W. PROSSER,
supra note 69, at 856 (emphasis added).
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consists of exploitation of process issued with justification.
Malicious use of process is the wrongful initiation of civil proceedings against another "without probable cause, that is, without a reasonable basis for thinking the claim . . . asserted [is]
valid."87 Abuse of process, on the other hand, is evidenced by
conduct collateral to normal processes of a lawsuit that abuses
an otherwise legitimate claim based on probable cause.
The Board's overriding emphasis on motive and intent in
deciding Power Systems, Inc. compounded this confusion in distinguishing abuse of process from malicious use of process.
Power Systems' lawsuit was legitimate on its face-the company
sought to recover expenses incurred in defending charges filed
maliciously and without probable cause by Sanford. The Board
was nevertheless determined to make an issue out of Power Systems' palpable antipathy toward Sanford and his use of the
Board's processes. The Board explained its decision in Power
Systems, Inc. with language borrowed from the union-plaintiff
cases. It declared that Power Systems "had no reasonable basis
for the filing of its lawsuit9'-language that suggests a finding of
malicious use of process.88 But in stating the facts, the Board
described a proper legal action seeking a designated lawful result, the objectives of which were neither illegal nor without a
reasonable belief of validity.- The Board only assailed Power
Systems' collateral objectives of penalizing Sanford for filing
charges with the Board and discouraging employees from using
the Board's processes. Intimating that Power Systems' lawsuit
was otherwise legitimate, the Board concluded that it was nevertheless an unfair labor practice since its true purpose was to
punish Sanford for asserting his rights under the NLRA and to
restrain him from asserting those rights in the future-an unmistakable articulation of the elements of abuse of process.@0
The Board's reliance on the union-plaintiff cases was inap87. F. HARPER
& F. JAMES,supra note 74, at 329. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF
TORTS8 682, Comment a (1972).
88. 239 N.L.R.B. at 450.
89. Power Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 936, 938-40 (7th Cir. 1979).
90. See 239 N.L.R.B. at 450. In rejecting the Board's conclusion that employer's
lawsuit was without a reasonable basis, the Seventh Circuit in Power Systems, Inc. v.
NLRB, 601 F.2d 936,940 (7th Cir. 1979), suggests its approval of this latter characterization. The employer approached the Board prior to its initiation of the state court action
to inquire whether its contemplated suit would violate the NLRA. This fact considered
with the stipulated facts on the record negate any notion that Power Systems, Inc. pursued its action in state court without believing that it had a reasonable basis.

.
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propriate since their departure from Clyde Taylor was uniquely
based on an implicit finding of malicious use of process, whereas
the Board in Power Systems, Inc. clearly articulated the elements of abuse of process. Because no coercive collateral conduct accompanied the lawsuit, and because ostensible anti-union
motivation alone is insufficient to substantiate a finding of abuse
of process,@'the Board was in the precarious position of finding
one tort by analyzing the facts, calling it another name by
straining precedent, and being unable to sustain either upon the
record. The Board's confusion was caused by its renewed flirtation with the notions of motive and intent, a result that demonstrates the error of straying from a literal interpretation of
Clyde Taylor.

C. Managerial Prerogative and the Irrelevance of Motive
and Intent
An employer's decision to invoke the legal process is a business decision, an exclusive exercise of managerial prerogative.
Section 8(a)(l) of the NLRA broadly restricts those exercises of
managerial prerogative that tend "to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section [7]" of the Act.- Anti-union motivation was initially an
essential element of subsections 8(a)(2)-(5) but not subsection
8(a)(l)." Judicial interpretations eventually blurred the distinction concerning motive? Consequently, a balancing test consid91. The Seventh Circuit's reversal of the Board's decision was very narrow; the
court refused to comment on anything other than the lack of substantial evidence to
support the Board's findings. Id. The confusion caused by the Board's misapplication of
the abuse of process theory and the Seventh Circuit's refusal to comment on the correct
application of the Clyde Taylor doctrine demonstrates the need for a closer examination
by the Board and the courts of the direction taken by the Board.
92. 29 U.S.C. 8 158(a)(l) (1976).
93. See Oberer, The Scienter Factor in Sections 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Labor Act:
Of Balancing, Hostile Motive, Dogs, and Tails, 52 CORNELL
L.Q.491 (1967).
94. Id. at 496-97. Section 8(a) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(I) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it . . .
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization . .
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he
has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter;

.
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ering motive and intent as determinative weights has been applied under section 8(a)(l) as well as under other subsections
dealing with particular instances of intentional discriminatory
conduct.s6 An employer's bona fide interest in furthering managerial objectives is typically weighed against the corresponding
impact on employee rights under the NLRA. This emphasis on
motive and intent in reviewing business decisions alleged to be
in violation of the NLRA apparently caused the Board to adopt
a similar mind-set in reviewing an employer's initiation of legal
proceedings against employees.
In Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing
Co.,@=
the United States Supreme Court isolated a particular category of managerial prerogative, the exercise of which would not
constitute a violation of section 8(a)(1) notwithstanding coincidental interference with section 7 rights. Justice Harlan's majority opinion declared that an employer's decision to go out of
business, although inspired totally by anti-union animus, was
not an unfair labor practice since the "proposition that a single
businessman cannot choose to go out of business if he wants to
would represent such a startling innovation that it should not be
entertained without the clearest manifestation of legislative intent or unequivocal judicial precedent so construing the Labor
Relations Act."@' A judicial exception was thus "engrafted upon
the otherwise plain language of the respective sections limiting
employer freedom, [an exception that] has been built around the
nonstatutory concept of management prerogative^."^^ Accordingly, the Court established by implication a category of business decisions that were intended to remain unscathed by section 8(a)(l) and its companion subsections.@@
The decision to invoke the legal process arguably represents
the kind of managerial prerogative protected by Darlington, a
right so fundamental to the concept of free enterprise that its
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
95. See Rabin, Limitations on Employer Independent Action, 27 VAND.L. REV.
133, 137 (1974).
96. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
97. Id. at 270.
98. Rabin, supra note 95, at 145.
99. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U S . 300 (1965). "[Wle have consistently construed the section to leave unscathed a wide range of employer action taken to
serve legitimate business interests in some significant fashion, even though the Act committed may tend to discourage union membership." Id. at 311.
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deprivation should be considered only after the "clearest manifestation of legislative intent or unequivocal judicial precedent
so construing the Labor Relations Act."loO No such intent is
manifest.
Clyde Taylor implicitly rejected the use of a balancing test
where an employer's interest in the private managerial function
of initiating a lawsuit is weighed against the corresponding impact on employee rights under the NLRA. The Board concluded
that in enforcing employee rights under the NLRA, it would accommodate the absolute right of all persons to litigate their
claims in court. Such accommodation does not contemplate the
traditional balancing approach employed in reviewing other
types of business decisions that negatively impact on section 7
rights. Accommodation signifies the attitude prescribed by the
Supreme Court in Darlington. The Court stated, in effect, that
it would accommodate its enforcement of the NLRA to the right
of all employers to go out of business;101it would abandon the
balancing scales when the exercise of paramount rights of managerial prerogative are challenged as unfair labor practices. In
Clyde Taylor the Board announced its decision to accord the
same presumptive protection to the specific right to invoke the
legal process. The Board's anomalous departure from a literal
interpretation of Clyde Taylor in Power Systems Inc. is either a
manifestation of progressive atrophy in its ability to comprehend the soundness of its prior reasoning, or an intentional return to the Carter approach spawned by renewed veneration of a
test based on motive and intent. In either case, the Board should
have recognized after Darlington that only a literal application
of Clyde Taylor is consistent with the policy established by the
Supreme Court in this protected area of managerial prerogative.
IV. CONCLUSION
Subsection 8(a)(l) and its companion subsections place restrictions on certain types of business conduct that have a coercive or restraining effect on employees' exercise of section 7
100. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. at 270.
101. The Court acknowledged the general attitude among, the courts of appeals
which had "generally assumed that a complete cessation of business will remove an employer from future coverage by the Act." Id. at 270-71. "The Act 'does not compel a
person to become or remain an employee. It does not compel one to become or remain an
employer.'" Id. at 271 (quoting Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir.
1963)).
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rights. In enforcing the NLRA, the Board is called upon to balance the respective interests of management and labor. An employer's interest in achieving particular business objectives is
weighed against the corresponding impact on employees' rights
under the NLRA. Conduct that tends to coerce or interfere with
section 7 rights constitutes an unfair labor practice unless the
coercive impact is both slight and merely incidental to the
pursuit of legitimate management objectives. In the balancing
process, anti-union animus is a significant factor "When an employer is motivated by anti-union animus, the danger of interference with the alarm that employees will feel about the exercise
of Section 7 rights is always increased."lo2
Employer lawsuits potentially impact on employees' exercise of section 7 rights. However the Board recognized in Clyde
Taylor the paramount importance of an employer's right to invoke the legal process and announced that it would accommodate its enforcement of the NLRA to the right of employers to
litigate their claims in court. The Board rejected the traditional
balancing approach, which among other things, weighed the motive and intent underlying an employer's resort to legal
processes. Although a threat to sue if employees did not abandon their section 7 rights continued to be an unfair labor practice, the actual filing of a lawsuit was left unscathed by the statutory restrictions of section 8.1°a
The Board's gradual departure from the literal interpretation of Clyde Taylor, culminating in Power Systems, Inc., represents a rejection of sound public policy. The Board's implicit reliance on an abuse of process theory is not well founded since
anti-union animus alone is insufficient to corrupt an otherwise
valid lawsuit. There can be no abuse of process absent collateral
conduct that deviates from the normal pursuit of a legal claim to
its designed end. The Board errs in labeling anti-union motivation an "unlawful objective" in order to invalidate a lawsuit as
102. Shieber & Moore, Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act: A
Rationale-Part 11, Encouragement or Discouragement of Membership in any Labor
Organization and the Significance of Employer Motive, 33 LA. L. REV.1, 23 (1972)
(footnote omitted).
103. The Ninth Circuit has stated without qualification that "the Board consistently
has held that despite the coercive effect upon employees' statutory rights, the filing of a
civil suit by an employer or by a union cannot be found to be an unfair labor practice."
Bergman v. NLRB, 577 F.2d 100,103 (9th Cir. 1978);accord, IAMAW v. United Aircraft
Corp., 534 F.2d 422, 464-65 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976); Smith Steel
Workers v. A.O. Smith Co., 420 F.2d 1, 9 (7th Cir. 1969).
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an abuse of process or a malicious use of process.
The Board also violates the spirit of Darlington by failing to
recognize a specific instance of managerial prerogative that lies
beyond the appropriate reach of motive and intent analysis.
Clyde Taylor correctly characterized the right to resort to the
courts as a right deserving strict accommodation by the Board in
its enforcement of the NLRA. Only strict accommodation binds
the fallible hands of those who attempt to shape unfair labor
practices from anti-union animus.

Val John Christensen

